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LIEN OR PRIORITY UNDER SECTION 10, UNIFORM
TRUST RECEIPTS ACT
RICHARD W. DUESENBERG *
It is in the context of insolvency that the fitness of any security
device must be judged. Even a borrower's dishonesty is not likely to
be damaging to a creditor, unless the infidelity is either the cause,
consequence or concomitant of financial collapse. If the security is
inventory, it is intelligent to devise a method to shift the protection
on sale of the chattel security, as sale is the objective of inventory,
and the creditor's overriding concern is security up to the moment
of payment. Cash is the medium of the inventory creditor's payment,
and it is cash that ultimately stands in the place of sold inventory, the
cash having been received either directly from the consumer or from
another financing agency advancing money to make possible the
retail sale. Inasmuch as cash proceeds are easily commingled, tracing
is often impossible. Once identity is lost, no substituted property
remains to which the secured position of the inventory creditor can
be attached. Aside from assets already encumbered, the only other
property to which the once secured creditor can look is the general
assets of the estate.
The common law demurred to transferring security to general
assets, though traceable proceeds were often encumbered. However,
the Uniform Trust Receipts Act' provided for a "priority," in favor
of the entruster, to any proceeds or other value, whether identifiable or
not. To the inventory financer whose credit expectations have been
disappointed, this right may be important, and the paucity of cases
litigated thereon is probably no gauge of its significance.'
Those familiar with secured commercial transactions will know
of the difficulty successfully encountered by this statutorily created
right in the Harpeth3 decision of 1955. The "priority" appeared to
conflict with certain provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Ace
declaring invalid all state-created priorities other than an irrelevant
priority in favor of landlords. The trust receipt security impressed
4' Associate Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1951, LL.B. 1953, Val-
paraiso University LL.M. 1956, Yale Law School.
1 § 10b.
2 This comment is not concerned with the entruster's rights in traceable proceeds
(UTRA 1 10c), or with the effect of UTRA § 9 on the entruster's rights.
3 In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 863 (M.D. Tenn. 1955).
4 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. 1 104 (1952).
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against the general assets of the bankrupt trustee passed muster as
valid on the grounds of being a lien rather than a priority. Creditors
were happy, as were commentators. 5
Judicial authority became evenly split, however, with the recent
case of In re Crosstown Motors,' and it is the reasoning of this case
which is here compared to Harpeth. 7
Both opinions are thought through in a lawyer-like fashion—
logical, consistent, analytical. But they are markedly different in
approach, as can be seen from the respective courts' initial remarks
on the primary issue, namely the conflict between the Trust Receipts
Act and the Bankruptcy Act. The Crosstown reasoning begins:
"The Uniform Trust Receipts Act was drafted long prior
to 1938. It was adopted by the Illinois legislature in 1935.
At that time § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act specifically recog-
nized state-created priorities. Thus the object to be attained
by § 10 of the Illinois Trust Receipts Act was to give to the
entruster a priority ahead of general creditors upon insolvency
of the trustee. Nothing more was necessary. Nothing more
was contemplated. The legislative intent was crystal clear." 8
In contrast the Harpeth decision of several years earlier empha-
sized the purpose of the trust receipt, took not so certain a disposition
of the clarity of legislative intent, and put the two together for a
protection of the security interest. The interpretation of UTRA
Section 10(b) as recorded in Crosstown was by the Harpeth court
regarded as too confining, as ignoring that provision of Section 10
which states that the priority runs to unidentifiable proceeds "to the
extent to which and as against all classes of persons as to whom
his security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the
trustee." In the words of the court:
"The right to receive the 'value' derived from the sale or
disposition of entrusted goods necessarily contemplates
payment of such value out of the general assets of the trustee.
5 34 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 294 (1956), 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1343 (1956).
6 272 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. den., 363 U.S. 811 (1960), commented on in
35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 948 (1960).
7 A third case on the problem of the Harpeth doctrine was recently in the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals. The court specifically avoided ruling on the question of
priority versus lien, and reversed on the ground that since it appeared that proceeds
were received from the out-of-trust sale long before the crucial ten-day period of
10b, no rights under that section would be available, notwithstanding what might
be the court's opinion on whether 10b created a lien or priority. English v. Universal
CIT Corp., 278 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960).
s In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., supra note 6, at 226.
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It thus constitutes a charge against the trustee's property
and being, by the express terms of the statute, valid and
enforceable against and having priority over both general
and subsequent lien creditors as well as subsequent purchasers
other than purchasers in the ordinary course of trade, it is
practically and legally indistinguishable from a technical
lien."
Basic to the Crosstown decision is the accuracy of its evaluation
of legislative intent, for it is this evaluation which clothes the word
"priority" with a meaning necessary to the logic of the court's reason-
ing. One can hardly quarrel with the court's observation that the
UTRA preceded the 1938 amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, which
before then specifically recognized state-created priorities, and that
"priority," not "lien," was the word used in the UTRA. That is naked
fact. What is vulnerable is its giving to "priority" the status of a term
of art, the consequence of which is to bring it within the condemnation
of Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act. Neither the word "lien" nor
"priority" is so well defined that use of either ought alone to be
operative to fit it into the well defined bankruptcy consequences which
follow. 1° Furthermore, the emphasis which the Crosstown court gave
to the chronology of the pertinent legislative material weakens its
persuasiveness for a similar case in a jurisdiction where adoption of
the UTRA came after the 1938 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.
There are a good number of such states, all of which have retained
the word "priority" in Section lob, but obviously not for the reason
assigned by the Crosstown decision.
It is, of course, true that Crosstown dealt with a jurisdiction in
which the priority of statutory adoption put the Trust Receipts Act
first, and some may on that account deem the preceding remark
irrelevant. Yet, there is no absolutely compelling reason to agree with
the court's argument that because state-created priorities were pro-
In re Harpeth Motors, Inc., supra note 3, at 868.
10 "Considerable confusion exists in bankruptcy administration because of a failure
to distinguish clearly between a valid lien and a right to prior payment from unen-
cumbered assets. The former entails a right to enforcement independent of bankruptcy;
it may be created by agreement or statute, or by judgment of a court. The latter is a
narrow right to payment at a certain relative point in the distribution of a bankrupt
debtor's property, naked of any power of levy or attachment; it is a creature of the
Bankruptcy Act. Quite different consequences in bankruptcy are appended to each.
A valid lien, subject to the qualifications and restrictions previously stated, is a charge
against assets which must be met before distribution to unsecured creditors begins. A
right to priority accords an unsecured claim a particular precedence over other claims
in the distribution of the bankrupt's remaining assets." 3 Collier, Bankruptcy I 64.02,
at 2055 (14th ed. 1941).
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tected in bankruptcy administration at the time the UTRA was enacted
in Illinois, it necessarily followed that "priority," in the bankruptcy
sense, and nothing more, was intended.' Nor is it true, as one writer
has suggested," that creation of a lien makes superfluous provision
for a priority, for entitling a debt claim to priority could become
valuable if for some reason a lien securing that debt failed to arise
for want of perfecting a requisite." It could be that is what the
drafters of the UTRA (and legislatures adopting it) had in mind.
That may never be known; but bear in mind that the overriding
terminology of the UTRA, in referring to the device it codified and
embellished for certain types of creditors, is not "priority", but
"security interest." This is the term used in Section 10, which adds
that the entruster's rights to unidentifiable proceeds shall be "to the
extent to which and as against all classes of persons as to whom his
security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the trustee."
There is no question, as the Harpeth case pointed out, that the right
in the entrusted goods at the time of their sale is a lien," and when
Section 10b adds the clause containing the word "priority," it uses
the conjunctive "and".
There is much in the UTRA which is unclear, not least of which
is Section 10. The comments of the uniform commissioners are not of
much help, and a search for legislative intent is like pursuing a will-
o'-the-wisp. Had a case on these facts arisen prior to 1938, something
authoritative on what the courts would have done with this trouble-
some word might have been available; but there was no such case.
In any event, it is hard to go along with the Crosstown view that "the
reason for the absence of the word `lien' and the use of the word
`priority' is pellucid,"" or with the view that if the word "priority"
were a deliberate artistic choice, it necessarily ruled out the concur-
rent existence of a lien."
The lack of coordination between existing commercial statutes,
in this case between the Bankruptcy Act and the UTRA, presents
problems which for solution merit more than a chronological alignment
to point the way to a proper statutory interpretation. Subsequent
legislation is a legitimate consideration for a potential adjustment of
11 Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 948, 951 (1960).
12 Ibid.
13 3 Collier, op. cit. supra note 10, g 64.02 at 2056,
14 Other cases also have held the entruster to have a lien on identifiable proceeds,
e.g., Universal Credit Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 224 Ind. 1, 64 N.E.2d 28 (1945).
15 In re Crosstown Motors, Inc., supra note 6, at 227.
74 In this connection, it might be noted that the reasons for establishing a lien
before the 1938 Bankruptcy Act amendment would have been less compelling, especially
if assets enough to satisfy the priority were available from the general estate.
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former rules, if such shifting can be made without doing violence to
the words of a given statute. The amendment to Section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act, which gave rise to the problem of these cases, was
designed primarily to protect those general creditors who were stripped
of their participation in an insolvent estate for being too far down the
line of priorities set forth under the many state insolvency laws. For
while application of state insolvency laws was deemed suspended, their
priorities continued to be recognized under the Bankruptcy Act,
Section 64(b). 17
 This was true of an assignment or state receivership
and of statutes concerning certain classes of debts." Innumerable
statutes of these types not only operated to cut off some creditors en-
tirely, but also made for highly disparate bankruptcy administrations
among the states.
Neither before nor after the 1938 amendment were liens affected
by Section 64. To a statutory lien, Section 67 of the Act applies. A
chattel mortgagee or conditional vendor, so long as he was not amiss
as to Section 60, had first to be satisfied before payment of adminis-
tration costs or other creditors was made. As between these two
categories, the trust receipt fits more the former. For a trust receipt
is a chattel security built on a common law history of its own, and
given an expanded vitality under a statute which, with all its imper-
fections, was designed to assure inventory financers maximum security
for the risks assumed in their commercially important function. The
central inquiry ought therefore to be what substance did the framers
of the UTRA intend to give to this "security interest" which the act
created, and to fit this into the dichotomous terminology of the
Bankruptcy Act as it reads today, not as it read before 1938. Com-
mercial lawyers are familiar with this interpretive technique, for again
and again it has been a necessary means by which to reconcile the
welter of commercial legislation which is at once confusing, conflicting,
and overlapping.' What the court in Crosstown called an obvious
historical statutory interpretation, and what at least one commentator
has said is required from a "common sense" interpretation,' becomes
less obvious and perhaps somewhat senseless if it is clear that the
UTRA was intended to give to creditors a security interest designed
to be worthy of the name, designed to hold up at the most significant
time, in bankruptcy. In this context, the view of the Harpeth opinion
17 In re Western Implement Co., 166 Fed. 576 (D. Minn. 1909).
18 See Comment, Effect of Priorities Allowed by State Statutes in Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 42 Yale L.J. 412 (1933).
19 Coin Machine Accept Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951) (a case
coordinating the UTRA with § 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act) is an example.
20 Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 948, 951 (1960).
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that the right created by Section 10b of the UTRA is the "legal and
practical equivalent to a lien" is meaningful.
II
Resolving the Iien versus priority problem of Section lob in
favor of a security interest disposes of one problem as it advances to
others. In order for a creditor to claim the rights set forth in Section
lob, one or a combination of the conditions of that section must take
place. Within ten clays of the receipt of proceeds of the out-of-trust
sale, there must follow either a judicial insolvency proceeding, ap-
pointment of a receiver, filing of a petition in bankruptcy, or a demand
made upon the trustee for an accounting. Three of these conditions
could take place before four months from the filing of a petition in
bankruptcy; the fourth always will be within the four-month pre-
ference period of Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act." Two questions
arise: first, if the events of the ten-day period occur within four
months of a filing of a petition in bankruptcy, is there a preference,
and second, if there is no preference, whether because of the occurrence
of the conditions before the four-month period or for some other
reason, would the security established under UTRA Section 10b
be jeopardized because of the rule of Constance v. Harvey?".
Here again there is the problem of coordinating the UTRA and
the Bankruptcy Act. By Section 60 of the latter act, a transfer made
on a given date will be deemed to have taken place on some other date,
if such other date is the time at which it has been so far perfected
that it would have been effective against a creditor acquiring a lien
by equitable or legal proceedings on a simple contract.' It should be
beyond argument that from the time of the trust receipt transaction
until the date of the out-of-trust sale, the entruster has no interest
in the other assets of the trustee. He has affixed his security interest
to the chattel subject to the trust receipt contract, and all other assets
of the trustee not already encumbered under some other security
agreement may become security for another's claim by contract or by
legal or equitable proceedings. That being the case, it follows that
if receipt of unidentifiable proceeds from the out-of-trust sale took
place within four months of a filing of a petition in bankruptcy against
21 A preference set forth in § 60a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act is a transfer of the
bankrupt's property made or suffered by the bankrupt while insolvent and within
four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, to a creditor, for or on account
of an antecedent debt.
22 215 F.2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert. den., 348 U.S. 913 (1954).
28 Bankruptcy Act 60a(2), 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
	 96a(2)
(1952).
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the trustee, shifting the security to general assets would, other things
being equal, be preferential.
Notice that this result is not made to depend on a reading of
Section 10b which views the events enumerated therein as conditions
precedent to the rights given to the entruster. It considers the out-of-
trust sale with receipt of proceeds as a condition to rights arising in
favor of the entruster against the general assets of the estate, but not
the requirement of a demand, assignment, or judicial insolvency pro-
ceeding. This leaves open the admittedly microscopic possibility that
an entruster would be protected where acquisition of receipts pre-
ceded the four-month period before the date of filing a petition in
bankruptcy, but the demand for an accounting occurred within it.
Protection of the entruster in this latter instance might be achieved
by considering the right of Section 10b as a continuing right, rather
than one made to depend on the occurrence of one of the conditions
stipulated in that section. This might be splitting hairs, and in any
event it is open to question. For if the general assets of the trustee
may be encumbered before the out-of-trust sale, why can they not be
after the sale? Perhaps they can be; but if so, it makes no sense to
limit the period for encumbering the assets to the time between the
getting of receipts and the date on which the demand or other con-
dition of UTRA Section 10b occurs. 24 There is nothing public about
the demand required by Section 10b, and therefore, there is nothing
about such an act which conceivably can be regarded as putting a
subsequent lien creditor on notice of the Section 10b claim of an
entruster. The only thing of public record is the notice filed at some
anterior time, and it might be argued that this puts a subsequent
attaching creditor on notice that if the subject of a trust receipt
transaction has been sold, the security will have transferred automati-
cally to the general assets for at least a ten-day period. This is a
right, it can be argued, which the UTRA gave, and which the parties
to the trust receipt transaction contemplated, and about which all
others dealing with another engaged as a trustee in trust receipt
financing may be said to be aware."
Search for authority on the nature of the Section 10b right, that
is, whether it might be preferential or not, has been without result.
24 Comment, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 948, 954 (1960).
25 A similar approach of "continuous" or "automatic" security to defeat a subsequent
creditor even where the out-of-trust sale takes place within the four-month period
should be rejected. While it is true that the trust receipt notice has been on record, it
is also true that while the entrusted chattel remains unsold, the entruster looks pri-
marily to it for security, and the UTRA gives no rights to the general assets during this
time.
79
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The Harpeth case referred to the right of Section 1 Ob as "continuing,"
but the case did not involve any problem of a preference. Any analogy
to an entruster's rights in identifiable proceeds (UTRA Section 10c)
is, as with the case of the floating charge of a chattel mortgage or
factor's lien, imperfect because it is substantively distinguishable.
By viewing the after-acquired property clause as an effective present
transfer of a future interest, the subsequently acquired property is
received encumbered, so that no time exists in which a lien creditor
could intervene.26 There the security interest may be deemed perfected
at the time of entering and promptly filing or recording the contract,
which describes the type of encumbered property with the precision
called for by the pertinent statute. The UTRA is not intended to
create a floating security in the same sense as does a factor's lien
statute, and it would seem to avail the entruster of nought to argue
in terms of an inchoate or equitable lien, for another provision of the
Bankruptcy Act addresses itself as follows: 27
"The recognition of equitable liens where available means of
perfecting legal liens have not been employed is hereby
declared to be contrary to the policy of this section."
Characterization as preferential where receipt of proceeds is within
four months of a filing seems highly probable, if not inevitable.
Destruction of the entruster's lien security under the preference
section of the bankruptcy law does not mean that the effort to get
his security denominated a lien is much ado about nothing. For the
preference problem may be avoided where the bankruptcy takes place
more than four months after the demand for an accounting is made.
In a fact pattern free from the issue of a preference, two additional
problems emerge: first, Constance v. Harvey,' and second, the question
of whether due diligence must follow demand. .
In some states, the Constance v. Harvey doctrine might be a
problem.29 Not all jurisdictions follow the rule that a trustee in
bankruptcy, through his status as an ideal hypothetical creditor, has
the rights of a creditor, though nonexistent, who intervened between
28 This is well presented in Weeks, Floating Liens In Inventory Financing, 1956
Ill. L. Forum 557, 576-78 (1956).
27 Bankruptcy Act g 60a(6).
28 Supra note 21.
20 The rule of Constance v. Harvey has been roundly criticized, e.g., Weintraub,
The Strong Arm Strikes The Belated Chattel Mortgage, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 261 (1956) ;
In re Gondola Assoc., 132 F. Supp. 205 (E.D. N.Y. 1955) ; and rejected, In re Alikasovich,
275 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1960). For a favorable analysis, see Kleinberg and Masterson,
Constance v. Harvey-A Defense, 62 Comm. L.J. 124 (1957).
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the date of entering a chattel mortgage and its delayed filing. Since
the rule grew out of a delayed filing situation in a jurisdiction where
delay made a chattel mortgage invalid as to all existing creditors or
creditors becoming such before filing, it is generally thought to apply
to trust receipts only where the filing of the notice of trust receipt
financing is subsequent to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy,"
in which case the security of the entruster is destroyed independent of
Constance v. Harvey. It is interesting to conjecture as to how this
doctrine might be applied to the security asserted by the entruster not
against the entrusted chattel or traceable proceeds, but as to unidentifi-
able assets. In this context it is useful to talk in terms of Section lob
being a continuing or automatic interest subject to extinguishment by
failure of one of the conditions of Section 10b. Since the UTRA does
not say that the entruster's Section lob claim against general assets
is invalid as against simple contract creditors becoming such before
the occurrence of one of its conditions, 31 and since the application of
the Constance v. Harvey doctrine depended on the existence of the
rule that a chattel mortgage was invalid as to all creditors existing or
becoming such before a delayed recordation, the conclusion should
be that the doctrine is not applicable in the context of UTRA Section
1 0 b.
Following up the demand for an accounting with a diligent pursuit
of the remedies available to the entruster is another matter. Should
a trust receipt creditor, who knows that entrusted chattels have been
sold, be permitted to make demand for an accounting, do nothing
further, and then be allowed to assert a security interest in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding which comes up four or more months thereafter?
Nothing in the UTRA conditions the entruster's lien, either on
identifiable or unidentifiable proceeds, on any action taken subsequent
to a failure of the trustee to comply with the demand. Nor are there
cases which have considered this point with regard to trust receipts,
though conditional vendors have been permitted to enforce their
security interest in spite of an apathy in enforcement." There is,
however, an argument for dissolving the entruster's security in un-
identifiable proceeds if there is not a prompt implementation of the
30 Marsh, The "Strong Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated, 43 Calif. L. Rev. 65, 70 (1955).
31 Also, as to the entrusted chattel, only the creditor who levies attachment or
execution prior to actual filing can defeat the security, regardless of the delay in filing.
1.3TRA §§ 3(1) and (2).
32 Mendelsohn v. Horan, 349 Ill. App. 91, 110 N.E.2d 75 (1952). Contra, Haines
v. Doss, 269 Ill. App. 179 (1933). Where a specific identifiable chattel is the security,
the problem is appreciably different.
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demand." The underlying principle of Benedict v. Ratner" is extant,
though the precise holding of that decision has been abrogated in many
states. One comment has been that "[s] ince a creditor knows that
cash proceeds are easily dissipated in the course of business, the
entruster who permits a dealer to continue business without promptly
enforcing his lien depends, just as any unsecured creditor, on the
dealer's honesty and continued solvency rather than on his collateral.'
Against this, it may be argued that bringing suit for the proceeds
may precipitate the final collapse which everyone hoped to avoid."
The best judgment may be to string along with the debtor's money
headaches, which would not be possible if the passage of time in itself
should be deemed to dissolve the lien.
If inaction by the entruster for a period substantially beyond
the ten-day limit of Section 10b should impair the lien, it means that
almost all cases of a Section 10b claim will fail, if for no other reason,
either for want of diligence or as constituting a preference. The con-
clusion of these speculations is that the priority or lien question of
Section 10b is only the beginning of the entruster's trouble, and that
very likely there is no way of giving to the dealer's most significant
creditor the security he ought to have short of an amendment to the
UTRA, the Bankruptcy Act, or both."
33
 The question obviously does not arise where the occurring event of § 10b is
bankruptcy.
34
 268 U.S. 353 (1925). This is the case, it will be recalled, which condemned an
accounts receivable security which permitted the assignor to use the proceeds in his
discretion. Seeming ownership because of possession retained, or the reservation of
dominion inconsistent with an attempted effective disposition of title or creation of a
lien, have often resulted in the imputation of fraud and the resultant invalidation of the
security. This as a problem should cease under the UCC, since the Code expressly
rejects the Benedict v. Ratner rule. UCC § 9-205.
$5
 Note, 66 Yale L.J. 922, 933 (1957).
36 The strength of this objection fades when it is recognized that most of these
cases will probably arise where bankruptcy is imminent and inevitable.
87 Still another argument directed at the vitality of a UTRA I 10b claim in bank-
ruptcy is that it comes within the provisions of § 67 of the Bankruptcy Act, as a
statutory lien. All three cases, supra notes 3, 6 and 7, involving the Harpeth problem
made reference to § 67, but only Harpeth specifically rejected the application of UTRA
§ 10b to the Bankruptcy Act rules on statutory liens. The unreported lower court
decision in the Crosstown case stated by way of dictum that the lien of UTRA § 10b
is statutory and therefore invalid under Bankruptcy Act § 67. In so stating, the court
overlooked the fact that a reduction of the lien to possession, even if done within the
four months of filing a petition in bankruptcy, takes even a statutory lien act out of
67. 2 Bankr. L. Rep. 1 59479 (N.D. III. 1959), 33 Ref. J. 58 (1959). See also, White
v. Kiefer, 127 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1942). The generally approved view that the right
under UTRA I 10b is not a statutory lien is well expressed in the following: "It is
suggested, however, that the lien created or recognized by statute within the meaning
of	 67 arises primarily from an economic relationship defined by the legislature and
not from the terms of a contract providing for security. .
	 By this test the security
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III
Whether the creditor is appreciably better off under the sounder
statutory basis of the Uniform Commercial Code is a bit problematical.
There is no sure basis for less pessimism about the fate in bankruptcy
of the Code-created right analogous to that of UTRA Section 10b.
Benefit of the Harpeth decision and its highlighting the problem of
priority or lien was not available for the 1952 draft, but steps were
taken to shift from the terminology of "priority" to "perfected security
interest" in the 1957 revision of the Code.'" It provides that:
The security interest in proceeds is a continuously perfected
interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected
but it ceases to be a perfected security interest and becomes
unperfected ten days after receipt of the proceeds by the
debtor unless
(a) a filed financing statement covering the original col-
lateral also covers proceeds; or
(b) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected before
the expiration of the ten day period.
With regard to non-identifiable cash proceeds, the secured party's
continuing security is in the debtor's cash and bank accounts in an
amount equal to the cash proceeds received and commingled or
deposited within ten days before the institution of insolvency pro-
ceedings, less the amount of cash proceeds paid by the debtor during
that ten-day period."'
While the Code purports to elevate the interest to that of a
continuing perfected security, it is not clear that such results will
follow, for though state law defines perfection," irreconcilable con-
flicts must be resolved in favor of the Bankruptcy Act.' For instance,
would the argument of an antecedent debt, in the past successfully
used against the after-acquired property clause, be available in a
bankruptcy administration to defeat the asserted security in the
debtor's cash and bank accounts? Though the Code designation of
the Section 9-306(4) right as continuous might be deemed arbitrary,
the better view would be that since the claim to the cash funds and
of a trust receipt, a mortgage on shifting stock of merchandise, a factor's lien, or a
secured transaction within Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is contractual
rather than statutory. . . .” 4 Collier, op, cit. supra note 10, ¶ 67.20 at 184.
38 UCC § 9-306(3) (Final Draft 1952), 9-306(3) (Supp. No. 1, 1955), 9-306(3)
(Official Text, 1958).
39 UCC § 9-306(4)(d)(ii). This is a change from existing law.
40 Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
41 Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931).
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bank accounts is limited to the value of the cash received it is
substitionary, and not a transfer for an antecedent debt, notwith-
standing that the interest provided for is intended to attach to assets,
whether or not they were themselves proceeds of the disposed col-
lateral. 42
Still another potential roadblock to the Code-created right to
unidentifiable cash proceeds is its apparent hostility to the Bank-
ruptcy Act's condemnation of equitable liens. 43 Here, whether or
not a present consideration is deemed to have been given, the transfer
may fail if all available means to protect the security interest
against all third parties, buyers in the ordinary course excluded, have
not been taken, and the interest is "only an equitable lien"." Except
for the Bankruptcy Act's failure to define "only an equitable lien"
and the Code's characterization of the Section 9-306(4) interest as
"perfected", reconciliation of the two statutes would be troublesome,
particularly in view of the right of all recipients for value of the
encumbered funds to take free of the secured party's claim.' Especially
would this be true if the group of takers here protected is considered
as greater than the category "buyers in the ordinary course of trade","
notwithstanding the Code comment that the protection runs only to
"payments and transfers in ordinary course." 47 That the drafters of
the Code did not regard Section 9-306 as creating an equitable lien in
the bankruptcy sense is clearer than whether or not this will be given
judical implementation."
42 Or, it might be argued that the release of the chattel security through the sale
constitutes the giving of new value. Cf. UCC § 9-108. Though this is not the approach
of UCC § 9-306, it would seem more easily accepted than under § 9-108 in reference
to after acquired property clauses, where often the subsequently acquired goods greatly
exceed the value of the released collateral, thus raising the possibility of a voidable
preference at least to the extent of the value differential.
43 See text at note 27, supra.
44 Bankruptcy Act § 60a(6) (C).
45 Comment (c) to UCC § 9-306 reads: "Where cash proceeds are covered into the
debtor's checking account and paid out in the operation of the debtor's business, recipients
of the funds of course take free of any claim which the secured party may have in them
as proceeds . . . ."
48 Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(6) (A).
47 UCC 9-306 comment (c).
48 Any argument that the potential existence of a banker's lien by way of set-off
under UCC § 9-306 impairing the validity of the creditor's claim in bankruptcy for
Want of perfection should be rejected. Perfection for purposes of ascertaining the time
of transfer is tested by a successful intervention of a lien "obtainable by legal or
equitable proceedings on a simple contract." The banker's lien is essentially statutory,
not primarily the product of contract. See Comment, 49 Mich. L. Rev. 243 (1950).
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